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ABSTRACT

The effects of false heartbeat feedback on moral judgment
by
Scott Koenig

Advisors: Yu Gao and Hanah Chapman

Research on human morality is at a crossroads, with one side claiming that moral
judgment is the result of rational inference and the other side claiming that it is the result
of emotion-laden intuition. This study investigated whether emotion drives moral
judgment by manipulating a core component of the experience of emotion: physiological
arousal. The sample consisted of 77 undergraduate students at Brooklyn College (57%
women, 43% men; mean age = 20.1). One group of participants was led to believe their
heart was beating quickly, and another group slowly, while they read and evaluated a
series of text vignettes depicting moral transgressions. Based on affect-as-information
theory, I expected that perceiving elevated physiological arousal would intensify
negative emotional reactions to the transgressions. If emotion drives moral judgment,
this intensification would cause more severe moral condemnation. If emotion does not
drive moral judgment, the intensification would have no effect on condemnation. I also
tested several hypotheses related to individual differences: I expected perceiving
elevated arousal to affect moral judgment more for participants who (a) are better at
perceiving internal bodily signals, (b) are predisposed to react to internal bodily signals,
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and (c) have higher heart rate variability, which indicates greater functional integration of
visceral afferent signals into the frontal cortex. Against expectations, participants in the
slow heartbeat group gave more severe moral judgments than those in the fast group.
This effect was neither mediated by an intensification of negative emotional reactions
nor moderated by any individual differences. These findings do not straightforwardly
support the claim that moral judgment depends on emotion, but they are evidence that it
can be swayed by extraneous information.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Moral judgment is an important part of human social life. People tend to have
strong beliefs about what constitutes good and bad behavior (Skitka, 2010) and will
readily judge others’ behavior according to those standards (Greene & Haidt, 2002).
One long-running and central debate in the study of moral judgment is whether
judgment is driven mainly by emotion or reasoning. One side, sometimes called
sentimentalists, maintains that our moral evaluations of others’ behavior are grounded
primarily in emotional responses: flashes of positive or negative feelings that pull one’s
conscience toward a verdict of right or wrong (Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2006). The other side,
sometimes called rationalists, argues that people arrive at their judgments by
conducting cost-benefit analysis, weighing relevant moral principles, or engaging in
other types of inferential thought (Kohlberg, 1969; May, 2018; Piaget, 1932).
Adjudicating this debate is important because of the many ways moral judgments
shape institutions and cultures. The legal system (Shaffer, 1979), the political system
(Weisberg, 2005), and even quotidian social life (Rai & Fiske, 2011) are each driven in
large part by individuals expressing their sense of right and wrong. In these and other
domains, misconceptions about the mechanisms of moral judgment can have serious
consequences. Legal judges, for example, are expected to rely on careful reasoning
(Feigenson, 1997), yet studies suggest they give harsher decisions based on various
extrajudicial, emotion-related factors, like whether they are hungry (Danziger et al.,
2011), sleepy (Cho et al., 2017), or coming to work right after the local football team
suffered an unexpected loss (Eren & Mocan, 2018). In the latter case, the association
between the unexpected loss and sentence length was disproportionately strong for
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defendants of color. In politics, moral judgments are a core component of ideological
orientation (Graham et al., 2009; Koleva et al., 2012; Weisberg, 2005). If these
judgments are based primarily on emotion, then political appeals to reason may be less
effective than appeals to emotion and, depending on one’s point of view, leave society
worse equipped to address pressing challenges (Chapman et al., 2017; Van Bavel et
al., 2020).
Overall, research on real-world contexts like courtrooms and voting booths
underscores the practical importance of understanding how exactly people form moral
judgments. However, most of these studies are merely observational. The primary aim
of the present work is to experimentally test the hypothesis that emotion plays a causal
role in moral judgment. This work also aims to investigate the role of several
psychological and physiological individual differences that may shape emotion’s role in
moral judgment. By addressing these questions, this research can help advance the
sentimentalism-versus-rationalism debate and contribute to the development of
institutions and cultural practices that complement, rather than exacerbate the flaws of,
human moral decision-making.
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Chapter 2: Past studies of emotion in moral judgment
The most common forms of experimental evidence in the
sentimentalism-versus-rationalism debate are studies in which participants are made to
feel a certain emotion before making a moral decision. If moral decision-making is
based on emotion, then inducing emotion should affect moral decision-making.
Consistent with this premise, there is evidence that inducing certain emotions can shift
decisions in sacrificial dilemmas, such as the well-known trolley problem, wherein
participants must choose whether or not to harm one person in order to save a greater
number of people (Gawronski et al., 2018; Strohminger et al., 2011; Ugazio et al.,
2012). For example, in one study of American undergraduates, watching a funny video
was found to increase one’s willingness to endorse sacrifice for the greater good
(Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). The pleasantness of humor, the authors argue,
counteracts the unpleasant emotions associated with the prospect of deliberately
harming another person.
However, research using sacrificial dilemmas has been criticized on several
grounds. First, such dilemmas address only a narrow slice of morality: specific
instances in which an individual must reconcile two diametrically opposed moral
concerns, with life-and-death stakes. Moral decisions can take a wide range of other,
less dramatic forms (Abend, 2013). Second, the dilemmas may be too strange and
unrealistic to be externally valid even for the narrow slice of morality they are designed
to address. They feature fanciful and sometimes even absurd scenarios, like having to
forcibly remove someone’s kidney, or being offered a fortune to smother someone with
a pillow, that are just as likely to provoke laughter as sober evaluation (Bauman et al.,
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2014). Whether emotion drives more quotidian moral decisions—like judgments of
others’ behavior, or the choice between donating to charity and not—is less clear.
Most of the evidence for the role of emotion in more ordinary moral decisions
comes from studies in which experimenters induced disgust—by, for example, having
participants sit in a smelly room (Schnall et al., 2008) or sip a bitter drink (Eskine et al.,
2011)—before asking participants to judge other peoples’ behavior (but see Jackson et
al., 2016; Yip & Schweitzer, 2016). Disgust is thought to have originated as an
evolutionary adaptation for promoting disease avoidance, which, later in biological and
cultural evolution, was repurposed to enforce behavioral norms in social groups (Rozin
et al., 2009). It is useful for testing for emotion’s causal role in moral judgment because
it is a pre-normative emotion, in that it can be experienced in the absence of a moral
transgression (e.g., in response to offensive odors). In contrast, emotions like anger and
sadness are generally experienced in response to a moral transgression. Experimental
stimuli used to induce anger or sadness may complicate interpretations of results
because the stimuli themselves are likely to trigger moral judgment (Royzman et al.,
2009). Disgust inductions are therefore thought to offer a “pure” test of the role of
emotion in morality, as they do not confound the normative and affective aspects of a
judgment.
Consistent with a causal role for emotion in moral judgment, several studies of
American and U.K. undergraduate samples have found that disgust inductions do cause
more severe condemnations of moral transgressions (Eskine et al., 2011; Schnall et al.,
2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). However, a meta-analysis of such studies (Landy &
Goodwin, 2015a) and multiple large-sample attempts at replication (Ghelfi et al., 2020;
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Johnson et al., 2016) have suggested the effect of disgust on moral judgment is very
small at best, and possibly nonexistent.
In addition to this weak statistical evidence, disgust inductions have a number of
conceptual and methodological flaws that limit their utility. First, they may not be as pure
a manipulation of emotion as previously argued. Participants may view the act of being
placed in a smelly room or asked to drink a bitter liquid as offensive or disrespectful,
which may anger them and provoke a condemnatory mindset. In this case, it would be
hard to determine whether any increase in the severity of moral judgment is due to the
induced disgust per se (Landy & Goodwin, 2015b). Another concern is that disgust
inductions may be too conspicuous. For any emotion induction to affect judgment,
participants must misattribute their feelings to the target of judgment, not to the
induction. When participants are aware of the true source of the emotion, the induction’s
effect on judgment will weaken or disappear (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schwarz &
Clore, 1983). Some researchers have argued that certain methods of inducing disgust
may draw too much attention to themselves and thus disrupt the necessary
misattribution (Schnall et al., 2015).
One final concern with disgust inductions is that there may be exclusive
relationships between certain emotions and certain types of moral content. For
example, disgust has been linked to violations of moral sanctity, or purity (i.e., the
degradation of something considered sacred, like using a nation’s flag to clean a toilet),
while anger is thought to be evoked by violations of others’ autonomy (Rozin et al.,
1999; but see Cameron et al., 2015). If this is the case, disgust inductions are less
useful as tests of the role of emotion in morality for two reasons: First, links between
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disgust and violations of sanctity may not generalize across other emotion-content
pairs. Second, failing to account for this exclusive emotion-content relationship—by, for
example, testing a disgust induction’s effects on various types of moral content—can
dilute potential effects.
In sum, there are several reasons to doubt the utility of disgust inductions for the
study of moral judgment. This review suggests a need for new approaches to
manipulating emotion.
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Chapter 3: False heartbeat feedback
One method of manipulating emotion that does not share the same issues as
disgust inductions is false heartbeat feedback. In this approach, participants are given
incorrect (false) information about their state of physiological arousal, specifically their
heart rate (Valins, 1966). A large body of research suggests that physiological arousal,
defined as activation of the autonomic nervous system or endocrine system, is an
integral part of the subjective experience of emotion (Barrett, 2017; Damasio &
Carvalho, 2013). One framework for understanding arousal’s role in emotion—and, in
turn, decisions and behavior—is affect-as-information theory, which states that the
valence of a subjective feeling (i.e., how pleasant or unpleasant it is) provides
information about the goodness or badness of a given stimulus, while the arousal
associated with a feeling (such as an elevated heart rate) provides information about
the importance of that stimulus. The combination of valence and arousal, known as
affect, is thought to be a heuristic that guides judgments and behavior (Clore &
Storbeck, 2006).
One important property of the relationship between valence and arousal is that
arousal can intensify valence—that is, it can intensify the pleasantness or
unpleasantness associated with a given stimulus, which can then inform judgments of
that stimulus (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). By manipulating arousal, it is possible to
intensify emotional states and thus change decisions that are based on emotion.
Schachter and Singer (1962), for example, found that injecting a sample of American
undergraduate men with epinephrine, a sympathetic nervous system stimulant,
intensified their experiences of joy, anger, or amusement, depending on the context. In
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another study, Dutton and Aron (1974) asked a sample of Canadian men from the
community to walk across a suspension bridge over a deep ravine towards an
“attractive female interviewer”, who then gave the men her number in case they had
questions about the study. Compared to a group of men who walked across a lower and
sturdier bridge, the suspension bridge group was more likely to call the interviewer,
suggesting that the physiological arousal induced by crossing the higher bridge
intensified the men’s feelings of attraction to the interviewer (see also Gorn et al., 2001;
White et al., 1981).
While these seminal studies examined the effect of actual physiological arousal
on emotional experience and decision-making, the premise of false physiological
feedback is that manipulating the mere perception of arousal influences decisions as
well. In other words, if emotions are the subjective feeling of physiological activity
(James, 1884), a person’s feeling of that activity need not be accurate for their
judgments and behavior to change. As Valins (1966) put it, "If cognitive representations
of internal events are important for emotional behavior, then…nonveridical
representations of physiological changes should have the same effects as veridical
ones” (p. 401). Consistent with this prediction, American undergraduate men in Valins’
study who were led to believe that their heart was beating quickly rated pictures of
women as more attractive than men led to believe their heart was beating slowly.
Applied to the domain of morality, if emotion drives moral decision-making, then
manipulating perceptions of physiological arousal should change moral decisions.
Indeed, one study found that Canadian undergraduates who were led to believe their
heart was beating quickly, compared to those led to believe their heart was beating
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slowly, were more likely to volunteer their time for a charitable cause and less likely to
cheat for financial gain (Gu et al., 2013). However, there has been no published attempt
at replicating this effect. Moreover, this study examined only first-person moral behavior,
not third-party moral judgments of others’ actions.
Thus, the approach of the present research is to apply the method of false
heartbeat feedback to moral judgment. Witnessing a moral transgression is known to
cause emotions like disgust, anger, and pity (Pizarro et al., 2011; Skitka et al., 2004).
Affect-as-information theory predicts that experimentally increasing perceived heart rate
during the experience of such emotions will intensify them. If emotion drives moral
judgment, this intensification will increase the severity of moral judgment. If emotion
does not drive moral judgment, then false heartbeat feedback will have no effect on
moral judgment.
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Chapter 4: Individual differences
Interoception and mindful non-reactivity
It is important to note that affect is just one component of the subjective
experience of emotion. To gain a more complete understanding of the possible role of
emotion in moral judgment, the current work will consider the role of two additional
components: interoception, which is the perception of internal bodily signals (Craig,
2003), and mindful non-reactivity, which is the ability to perceive internal bodily signals
without reacting to them (Baer et al., 2006).
Valence and arousal are generally understood as bodily phenomena, and their
translation into subjective emotional experience depends on a person’s ability to
perceive and interpret bodily signals (Barrett, 2017). For example, the
heartbeat-perception task is a measure of interoception in which participants must count
their heartbeats over a given period of time without the use of physical touch (Schandry,
1981). In a study of U.K. community adults, participants completed the
heartbeat-perception task and then, as their heart rate was being recorded, reported
their level of arousal in response to a series of emotional images. For those with high
accuracy on the heartbeat-perception task, heart rate was more tightly linked to
self-reported emotional arousal (Dunn et al., 2010). In other words, the influence of
internal bodily signals on the subjective experience of emotion depended on a
participant’s sensitivity to those signals.
There is a good deal of evidence that the internal bodily signals detected via
interoceptive sensitivity shape not just emotions but also higher-order cognitive
processes (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). For example, the Iowa Gambling Task is a
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measure of strategic decision-making in which participants must choose cards one at a
time from four different decks, with the goal of maximizing financial reward. Two of the
decks are “good” and have a higher proportion of rewarding cards, while the other two
are “bad” and have a higher proportion of penalizing cards (Bechara et al., 1994). Most
participants are able to articulate which decks are good or bad after 40 or 50 trials.
However, after only about ten trials, most participants begin to show anticipatory “stress”
signals, as measured by heart rate and electrodermal activity, when hovering over the
bad decks—well before conscious awareness of which decks are bad (Bechara et al.,
1997). Crucially, the effects of these signals on decision-making depend on individual
differences in interoceptive sensitivity. Dunn and colleagues (2010) administered a
version of the Iowa Gambling Task while recording participants’ trial-by-trial fluctuations
in heart rate and electrodermal activity. They found that increases in heart rate and
electrodermal activity were better predictors of task performance in participants with
higher interoceptive sensitivity (i.e., higher accuracy on the heartbeat-perception task).
A similar pattern has also been observed in studies of moral judgment. In one of the
studies mentioned above (Schnall et al., 2008), researchers found that their disgust
inductions had the strongest effect on moral judgment for those who scored high on a
self-report measure of interoceptive sensitivity.
Another important aspect of the subjective experience of emotion is how
interoceptive signals are appraised after being perceived. People differ in their reactions
to interoceptive signals. One person, for example, might notice their own shortness of
breath and begin ruminating on its implications, while a different person with the same
level of interoceptive sensitivity might notice it and then brush it off (Desrosiers et al.,
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2014). Individual differences in this type of appraisal can be understood as differences
in mindful non-reactivity to inner experience, a construct that captures the predisposition
to consciously avoid reacting to internal bodily signals (Baer et al., 2006). Previous
research has found that mindful non-reactivity moderates the influence of bodily signals
on decision-making. Gu and colleagues (2013), for instance, found that the effect of
false heartbeat feedback on moral behavior was weaker for those high in self-reported
mindful non-reactivity. This suggests that the effect of internal bodily signals, and
therefore emotion, on moral decision-making, to the extent that they have an effect,
depends on one’s tendency to react to such signals.
To tie these lines of research together, the present research included both the
Private Body Consciousness (PBC) Scale (Miller et al., 1981), a self-report measure of
interoceptive sensitivity, and the “Mindful Non-Reactivity to Inner Experience” (MNR)
subscale of the Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006). I expected
that fast heartbeat feedback would have the strongest effect on moral judgment for
those who score high on interoceptive sensitivity but low on mindful non-reactivity to
inner experience—that is, those who are not just sensitive to internal bodily signals but
also inclined to react to them.
Heart rate variability
The final individual difference investigated in this study is heart rate variability
(HRV), which is the variation in the time intervals between heartbeats. According to the
neurovisceral integration model (Thayer & Lane, 2000), HRV is a marker of the
functional connectivity of the neural networks that integrate internal bodily signals with
higher-order cognition. Previous research has found that neurovisceral integration, as
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indexed by higher resting HRV, is associated with a higher tendency to incorporate
emotional information into moral decision-making (Park et al., 2016). Therefore, if
emotion drives moral judgment, I expected higher resting HRV to be associated with
higher wrongness judgments. I also examined the possibility that resting HRV
moderates the influence of false heartbeat feedback on moral judgment, such that false
heartbeat feedback has a stronger effect on those with more integration of visceral
signals into decision-making.
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Chapter 5: General plan of work
The main goal of the present research was to use false heartbeat feedback to
test the sentimentalist hypothesis that emotion drives moral judgment. Participants were
randomly assigned to perceive their own heartbeat as either fast or slow while they read
and evaluated a series of brief text vignettes depicting moral transgressions. According
to affect-as-information theory, hearing a fast heartbeat (i.e., perceiving physiological
arousal) should intensify the negative emotions experienced as a result of reading about
moral transgressions. If emotion drives moral judgment, this intensification will increase
the severity of moral judgment. If emotion does not drive moral judgment, then the false
heartbeat feedback will have no effect on moral judgment.
Participants judged three different types of behavior, divided according to Moral
Foundations Theory, which maintains that human morality consists of several innate
and modular domains, or foundations (Clifford et al., 2015; Graham et al., 2013). Two of
the types were moral transgressions: care/harm violations, in which a person
deliberately harms another person or an animal, and sanctity/degradation violations, in
which a person does something disgusting or sacrilegious but not obviously harmful.
The third type was included as a nonmoral control: social norm violations, in which a
person breaks a social convention with no clear moral connotations. Using these
categories made it possible to test two distinct parts of the sentimentalist hypothesis.
First is the amplification hypothesis, which is the claim that emotion can cause a person
to view a moral transgression as more morally wrong; most research on the role of
emotion in moral judgment has focused on this claim. Second is the moralization
hypothesis, the more controversial and relatively underexplored claim that emotion can
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cause a person to view a nonmoral act (e.g., a social norm violation) as morally wrong
(Pizarro et al., 2011). If fast heartbeat feedback causes care/harm and
sanctity/degradation violations, but not social norm violations, to be seen as more
morally wrong, it would support only the amplification hypothesis. If fast heartbeat
feedback causes participants to view social norm violations as more morally wrong as
well, it would also support the moralization hypothesis. Moreover, if the false heartbeat
feedback affects judgments of one moral transgression type more than the other, it
would support the claim that certain moral foundations are more grounded in emotion
than others.
In addition to testing two components of the sentimentalist hypothesis, a
secondary focus of this work was moderation by individual differences. Participants
completed questionnaires designed to assess interoceptive sensitivity and mindful
non-reactivity to inner experience. I expected that fast heartbeat feedback would have
the strongest effect on moral judgments among those who score high on interoceptive
sensitivity and low on mindful non-reactivity. Also, participants’ actual heart rate was
recorded throughout the experiment, regardless of their false heartbeat feedback
condition, and their resting HRV was calculated. I expected that the fast heartbeat
feedback would have the strongest effect on moral judgments for participants with high
resting HRV. See Figure 1 for a conceptual model of the main aims of the study.
The final, exploratory aim was to compare the contributions of perceived versus
measured heart rate—that is, subjective versus objective physiological arousal—to
moral judgment (see Figure 2). Specifically, I explored whether false heartbeat feedback
changes moral judgment directly, with no effect on measured heart rate (Figure 2, path
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c’), or indirectly, by changing measured heart rate (Figure 2, paths a and b). I also
explored the possibility that moral judgment is associated with measured heart rate
alone (Figure 2, path b).
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Figure 1

Conceptual model of study aims, which were to determine (1) whether false heartbeat feedback affects moral judgment, and if so,

whether negative feelings mediate this effect, and (2) whether individual differences in interoceptive sensitivity, mindful non-reactivity,
and heart rate variability moderate the effect of false heartbeat feedback on moral judgment.
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Figure 2
Conceptual model of possible relationships between false heartbeat feedback, measured heart
rate, and moral judgment.

18

Chapter 6: Methods
Hypotheses and methods were pre-registered with the Open Science
Framework. The pre-registration is accessible at https://osf.io/2dtrj.
Participants
I conducted an a priori power analysis using PANGEA (Westfall, 2015) based on
a linear mixed-effects model with a 2 (false heartbeat feedback condition: fast or slow) x
3 (type of vignette: care/harm, sanctity/degradation, or social norm) between-within
interaction effect, including participants and individual vignettes as random effects. This
analysis found that a sample size of 108 would provide 80% power to detect an effect
size of Cohen’s d = 0.45, which is analogous to the effect size from Gu and colleagues
(2013) (Cohen’s w = 0.25). However, pandemic restrictions on data collection limited the
sample size to 77, reducing power to 75%.
Participants were recruited via Brooklyn College’s research participant pool and
flyers posted around the Brooklyn College campus. The only inclusion criteria were that
participants be at least 18 years old and speak fluent English. Eighty-six people
participated in the study in exchange for either course credit or $10 cash. Nine (10.5%)
were excluded from all analyses because they doubted the authenticity of the heartbeat
feedback (see below for details of debriefing). Nine of the remaining 77 (11.7%) were
missing questionnaire and manipulation check data, due to experimenter error. These
nine were included in all analyses that did not require questionnaire or manipulation
check data. Characteristics of the sample can be found in Table 1. All procedures were
approved by the Institutional Review Board at the City University of New York. All
participants gave informed consent before beginning the study.
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Table 1
Demographic characteristics of sample with and without complete data.

Procedure
Participants were told during the consent process that the study had two
unrelated parts. One part was a study of decision-making in which they were to read
and evaluate different social scenarios. The other was a period of “equipment testing”
during which they were to help the experimenter test some new equipment the lab
recently acquired. The main part of this “new equipment” was an electrocardiogram
(ECG).
20

Electrocardiogram and headphones setup
Participants were seated in front of a computer and then fitted with two Ag-AgCl
disposable vinyl electrodes placed at a modified Lead II configuration: one electrode
below the right collarbone and the other above the left hip. Both contact areas were
cleaned using NuPrep gel before electrodes were affixed. Participants were asked to sit
still and relax for two minutes, during which time resting ECG data was collected. After
this rest period, participants were asked to put on headphones (as another part of the
“equipment testing”) and told that they would hear live feedback of their heartbeat as it
was recorded. However, the heartbeat sounds were pre-recorded. Participants were
randomly assigned to hear a heart rate of 96 beats per minute (bpm) (fast heartbeat
feedback) or 60 bpm (slow heartbeat feedback), based on the American Heart
Association’s definitions of a fast and slow heartbeat (2015). Random assignment was
conducted using random number generators in Microsoft Excel. The experimenter was
aware of each participant’s condition assignment throughout the pilot but was blinded to
condition for the remainder of data collection.
Moral judgment task
While hearing either a fast or slow heartbeat, participants read and evaluated a
series of Moral Foundations Vignettes (Clifford et al., 2015), which are short sentences
that describe a moral transgression, such as “You see a boy making fun of his brother
for getting dumped by his girlfriend.” Vignettes were presented one at a time, in random
order, above the question “How morally wrong is this action?”. Participants responded at
their own pace using a 1-6 Likert scale ranging from “not at all wrong” to “extremely
wrong”. Participants started by completing a practice trial, to familiarize themselves with
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the procedure, and they were allowed to ask questions about the procedure at any time.
Emotion rating task
After giving a moral wrongness judgment for each of the 30 vignettes,
participants iterated through the vignettes once more. This time, instead of answering
the question “How morally wrong is this action?” they answered the question “How
negative did this scenario make you feel?” Participants responded at their own pace
using a 1-6 Likert scale ranging from “not at all negative” to “extremely negative”.
Participants again started by completing a practice trial, to familiarize themselves with
the procedure, and they were allowed to ask questions about the procedure at any time.
The purpose of this block was to determine whether any observed difference in moral
judgment between the fast and slow heartbeat feedback groups was, in accordance
with affect-as-information theory, due specifically to the intensification of negative
feelings by the perception of elevated physiological arousal (see Figure 1).
Questionnaires
Once participants evaluated all 30 vignettes again, the headphones were
removed, the ECG recording was stopped, and participants completed a series of
questionnaires. First was the Private Body Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller et al.,
1981), which contains five items designed to assess interoceptive sensitivity (e.g., “I am
sensitive to internal bodily tensions”), with a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“extremely
uncharacteristic”) to 5 (“extremely characteristic”). This scale has been used previously
as a moderator of emotion in studies of moral judgment (Schnall et al., 2008).
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale in the current sample was 0.47. The second
questionnaire was the Mindful Non-Reactivity to Inner Experience subscale of the Five
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Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006), which contains seven items
designed to assess the tendency to notice feelings without reacting to them (e.g., “I
watch my feelings without getting lost in them”), with a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“very
rarely true”) to 5 (“very often true”) (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). Finally, participants
provided demographic information. Full questionnaires can be found in Appendices B
and C.
Manipulation check
After participants completed the questionnaires, they were asked to rate the
speed of the heartbeat they heard throughout the experiment, using a 1-7 Likert scale
ranging from “very slow” to “very fast”. This was to ensure that participants in the fast
heartbeat feedback group perceived their heartbeat as faster than those in the slow
heartbeat feedback group.
Debriefing
Once the experiment was finished, a funnel debriefing procedure was used to
determine whether participants were aware of the deception involved in the study.
Participants were first asked what they thought the purpose of the research was. Then
they were asked, “While you were doing the study, did you think that the part of the
study where you tested equipment was related to the part where you were asked to
evaluate the scenarios?” If they responded “yes”, they were asked to explain how they
thought they were related. Then they were asked, “While you were doing the study, did
you think that hearing your heartbeat might have affected your judgments about the
scenarios?” If they responded “yes”, they were asked to explain how they think hearing
their heartbeat affected their judgments. Finally, they were asked “Do you think the
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heartbeat sounds reflected your own heartbeat?” If they responded “no”, they were
asked to explain why not. Data from the nine (11.7%) participants who doubted that the
heartbeat sounds were their own, or who correctly guessed the hypothesis of the study,
were excluded from analysis.
After the funnel debriefing, the hypotheses and rationale for the study, as well as
the deception involved, were fully explained to participants (see Appendix D).
Participants were all given the option to withdraw their data from the study with no effect
on their compensation.
Materials
Ten moral transgression vignettes from each of the three categories—care/harm,
sanctity/degradation, and social norms—were randomly chosen with one constraint: To
minimize ceiling effects among the care/harm and sanctity/degradation vignettes, the
mean moral wrongness judgments of the selected vignettes, from published
standardization data (Clifford et al., 2015), did not exceed 3.4 out of 4. The full list of
vignettes and their standardized wrongness data can be found in Appendix A.
Data analysis
Psychophysiological data acquisition and quantification
Each participant’s ECG was visually inspected by a research assistant. Any
sections in which the peak of the QRS complex (the ECG component which
corresponds to an individual heartbeat) was not clearly identifiable were removed from
analyses. Any QRS peaks that the analysis software failed to detect were manually
identified. Heart rate data was collected and processed using an MP150 transducer and
Acqknowledge software (version 4.2) from Biopac (Biopac Systems, Inc., Goleta, CA).
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The mean heart rate across the moral judgment block (in bpm) was used for analyses.
Resting HRV data was processed using Kubios HRV software version 2.2 (Tarvainen et
al., 2014). HRV was calculated as the root mean square of successive differences
(RMSSD) between QRS peaks, in milliseconds.
Statistical analysis and inferences
To address the primary question of whether false heartbeat feedback affected
moral wrongness judgments, and whether this effect varied by vignette type, a linear
mixed-effects model was built with moral wrongness judgments as the outcome variable
(with the Likert options treated as a continuous variable from 1-6) and false heartbeat
feedback condition (fast or slow), vignette type (care/harm, sanctity/degradation, and
social norm), and a two-way interaction between false heartbeat feedback condition and
vignette type as fixed effects. Participants and the 30 individual vignettes were modeled
as random intercepts. The model was created using the lme4 package for R (Bates et
al., 2015).
To determine whether fast heartbeat feedback affected moral judgment
specifically by intensifying negative feelings (see Figure 1), a bootstrapped mediation
analysis (with 5000 resamples) was conducted with false heartbeat feedback condition
as the predictor, moral wrongness judgments as the outcome, and self-reported
negative feelings as the mediator. The mediation model was created using the lavaan
package for R (Rosseel, 2012).
To determine whether fast heartbeat feedback increased the severity of moral
judgments more for people high in interoceptive sensitivity but low in mindful
non-reactivity, a separate linear mixed-effects model was created (also with lme4 for R)
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with moral wrongness judgments as the outcome variable and the following as fixed
effects: false heartbeat feedback condition, mean private body consciousness (PBC)
score, mean mindful non-reactivity (MNR) score, the two-way interaction of false
heartbeat feedback condition and PBC score, the two-way interaction of false heartbeat
feedback condition and MNR score, and the three-way interaction of false heartbeat
feedback condition, PBC score, and MNR score. Participants and individual vignettes
were again modeled as random intercepts. This moderation was tested using a
separate mixed-effects model to preserve statistical power for the other analyses, as
nine participants had missing questionnaire data.
To test for moderation by HRV, a linear mixed-effects model was created with
moral wrongness judgments as the outcome variable and false heartbeat feedback
condition, HRV, and a two-way interaction between false heartbeat feedback condition
and HRV as fixed effects. Participants and individual items were modeled as random
intercepts.
To determine whether measured heart rate mediated the effect of false heartbeat
feedback on moral judgment, or whether measured heart rate is associated with moral
judgment regardless of false heartbeat feedback, a bootstrapped mediation analysis
(with 5000 resamples) was conducted (with lavaan for R). False heartbeat feedback
condition was modeled as the predictor, moral wrongness judgments as the outcome,
and mean heart rate during the moral judgment block as the mediator (see Figure 2).
Following recommendations from Pinheiro and Bates (2006), two plots were
created to check the assumptions of each linear mixed-effects model. First, to check for
homogeneity of variance, the standardized residuals were plotted against the fitted
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response values. Second, to check the assumption of normality of residuals, a
quantile-quantile plot was created to compare the distribution of the residuals against a
theoretical normal distribution.
Pilot
A pilot study was conducted with 28 participants to check the efficacy of the false
heartbeat feedback manipulation. To determine whether participants in the fast
heartbeat group believed their heart rates were higher than participants in the slow
heartbeat group, their subjective heart rate speed ratings were compared using an
independent-samples t-test. Those in the fast heartbeat group (n = 14) rated their
heartbeat as significantly faster than those in the slow heartbeat group (n = 14) (Mfast =
4.93, Mslow = 3.71, t = 4.12, p = .0004, Cohen’s d = 1.57). No changes were made to the
procedure following the pilot, so these 28 participants were included in analyses for the
main study.
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Chapter 7: Results
Manipulation check in total sample
The manipulation was checked once more in the total sample. Those in the fast
heartbeat group (n = 38) again rated their heartbeat as significantly faster than those in
the slow heartbeat group (n = 39) (Mfast = 4.59, Mslow = 3.71, t = 3.97, p = 0.001, Cohen’s
d = 0.79).
Data overview
Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics for the main continuous variables can
be found in Table 2. The distribution of moral wrongness judgments in percentage form
can be found in Figure 3 (for each individual vignette), Figure 4 (for each type of
vignette), and Figure 5 (for each type of vignette, split by false heartbeat feedback
condition). The distribution of moral wrongness judgments in numerical form (i.e., the six
Likert options treated as a continuous scale from 1 to 6), split by vignette type and false
heartbeat feedback condition, can be found in Figure 6. The distribution of negative
feeling ratings in numerical form can be found in Figure 7.
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Table 2
Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics of main continuous variables.

Note. PBC = private body consciousness (i.e., interoceptive sensitivity), MNR = mindful non-reactivity to inner experience, HR = heart
rate during moral judgment block, HRV = heart rate variability.
29
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Figure 3
Distribution of moral wrongness judgments (in percentage form) by individual vignette.

Note. Vignettes are identifiable here by their code (S = sanctity/degradation, C = care/harm, SN
= social norm). The full text of each vignette can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure 4
Distribution of moral wrongness judgments (in percentage form) by vignette type.

Figure 5
Distribution of moral wrongness judgments (in percentage form) by vignette type and condition.
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Figure 6
Distribution of moral judgments (numerical) by vignette type and condition.

Note. Points were horizontally jittered to improve readability.

Figure 7
Distribution of negative feelings (numerical) by vignette type and condition.

Note. Points were horizontally jittered to improve readability.
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Effects of false feedback condition and vignette type on moral judgment
Plots testing the model assumptions can be found in Appendix E. There was no
clear systematic increase or decrease in the variance of the fitted response values,
which indicates homoscedasticity. Also, there was a strong correspondence between
the actual residual quantiles and theoretical (normal) quantiles, suggesting the model
residuals were normally distributed.
A summary of the estimates of the linear mixed model can be found in Table 3.
The fixed effects explained 52.4% of the variance in moral judgment, while the fixed and
random effects together explained 68.7%. There was no main effect of false heartbeat
feedback condition (p = 0.930). However, there was an expected main effect of vignette
type, such that care/harm (β = 3.06, 95% CI [2.57, 3.56], p < 0.001) and
sanctity/degradation (β = 3.23, 95% CI [2.74, 3.72], p < 0.001) vignettes were
associated with significantly higher moral wrongness judgments than social norm
vignettes. There was also an interaction between false heartbeat feedback condition
and vignette type: Against expectations, fast heartbeat feedback decreased, rather than
increased, moral wrongness judgments for care/harm (β = -0.26, 95% CI [-0.48, -0.04],
p = 0.020) and sanctity/degradation (β = -0.31, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.10], p = 0.005)
vignettes relative to social norm vignettes.
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Table 3
Effects of false heartbeat feedback condition and vignette type on moral wrongness judgments.

Mediation by negative feelings
Because false heartbeat feedback condition affected moral judgment for
care/harm and sanctity/degradation but not social norm vignettes, mediation by negative
feelings was tested separately for each of the two moral vignette types. Results of the
mediation analysis can be seen in Figure 8. Self-reported negative feelings did not
mediate the effect of false heartbeat feedback condition on moral judgment for either
care/harm or sanctity/degradation vignettes. However, for both care/harm (β = 0.81,
95% CI [0.44, 1.35], p < 0.001) and sanctity/degradation (β = 0.66, 95% CI [0.41, 0.88],
p < 0.001) vignettes, higher negative feelings were independently associated with
higher moral wrongness judgments.
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Figure 8
Summary of model of mediation by negative feelings for care/harm (a) and sanctity/degradation
(b) vignettes separately.
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Moderation by individual differences
Interoceptive sensitivity and mindful non-reactivity
A summary of the model of moderation by interoceptive sensitivity and mindful
non-reactivity can be found in Table 4. Plots testing the assumptions of the model can
be found in Appendix E. The fixed effects explained 5.9% of the variance in moral
judgment, while the fixed and random effects together explained 41.8%. There were no
main or interaction effects of note.
Resting heart rate variability
A summary of the model of moderation by resting HRV can be found in Table 5.
Because the false heartbeat feedback affected only care/harm and sanctity/degradation
vignettes, only these two vignette types were included in the model. Plots testing model
assumptions can be found in Appendix E. The fixed effects explained 1.8% of the
variance in moral judgment, while the fixed and random effects together explained
39.5%. There was no main effect of HRV (p = 0.532). But there was a main effect of
false heartbeat feedback condition (β = -0.70, 95% CI [-1.31, -0.08], p = 0.026), such
that fast heartbeat feedback caused lower wrongness judgments than slow heartbeat
feedback. There was also a marginally significant interaction between false heartbeat
feedback condition and HRV (β = 0.01, 95% CI [0.00 - 0.02], p = 0.081) such that fast
heartbeat feedback caused higher moral wrongness judgments than slow heartbeat
feedback when HRV was high.
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Table 4
Summary of effects of false heartbeat feedback condition, interoceptive sensitivity (PBC), and
mindful non-reactivity (MNR) on moral wrongness judgments.

Note. PBC = private body consciousness (i.e., interoceptive sensitivity); MNR = mindful
non-reactivity.

Mediation by measured heart rate
As with mediation by negative feelings, mediation by measured heart rate was
modeled separately for each of the two moral vignette types. Results of the analysis can
be seen in Figure 9. False heartbeat feedback had no effect on measured heart rate,
ruling out mediation. However, for both sanctity/degradation (β = -.01, 95% CI [-0.03,
0.00], p = 0.077) and care/harm (β = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.00], p = 0.058) vignettes,
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Table 5
Summary of effects of false heartbeat feedback condition and HRV on moral wrongness
judgments for care/harm and sanctity/degradation transgression vignettes.

there was a marginally significant association between higher measured heart rate and
lower moral wrongness judgments. This goes against the expectation that a higher
measured heart rate would be associated with higher wrongness judgments. To further
probe this association, moral wrongness judgments were averaged across care/harm
and sanctity/degradation vignettes for each participant; these average wrongness
judgments were associated with lower measured heart rate (r = -0.24, p = 0.041).
Outlier check
There was an outlier in the fast heartbeat condition for moral wrongness
judgments and negative feeling ratings (see Figures 6 and 7). This participant did not
significantly differ from the others in any demographic factors, questionnaire responses,
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Figure 9
Summary of model testing mediation by measured heart rate (mean throughout moral judgment
block) for care/harm (a) and sanctity/degradation (b) vignettes separately.
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Table 6
Effects of false heartbeat feedback condition and vignette type on moral wrongness judgments
(with outlier removed).

or response times. Moreover, based on their responses during debriefing, there was no
indication that they failed to understand any of the tasks. Nonetheless, all analyses
were repeated with the outlier removed. There were no noteworthy differences in any of
the analyses except for the main linear mixed-effects model (Table 6) and the model of
moderation by HRV (Table 7). In the main linear mixed-effects model, the fit statistics
did not substantially change, but the interaction effects weakened. Coefficients for the
condition-by-care (β = -.21, 95% CI [-0.43, 0.01], p = 0.066) and the
condition-by-sanctity interactions (β = -.25, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.03], p = 0.025) moved
closer to zero, with the former failing to meet the threshold for significance. This
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Table 7
Effects of false heartbeat feedback condition and HRV on moral wrongness judgments for
care/harm and sanctity/degradation transgression vignettes (with outlier removed).

suggests the effect of the false heartbeat feedback on moral judgment was stronger for
sanctity/degradation vignettes than care/harm vignettes.
The revised model of moderation by HRV also showed weaker predictors as well
as a slight decrease in fit. The coefficient for the main effect of condition dropped out of
the range of significance (β = -0.49, 95% CI [-1.07, 0.08], p = 0.092) and the interaction
between false heartbeat feedback condition and HRV moved further out of the range (β
= 0.01, 95% CI [0.00 - 0.02], p = 0.177)
Additional exploratory analyses
Effects of false heartbeat feedback and vignette type on negative feelings
To explore the relationship between false heartbeat feedback, vignette type, and
self-reported negative feelings, the linear mixed-effects model shown in Table 3 was
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Table 8
Effects of false heartbeat feedback condition and vignette type on negative feelings.

built again but with self-reported negative feelings as the outcome instead of moral
wrongness judgment. The results of this model can be found in Table 8. Plots testing the
assumptions of the model can be found in Appendix E. The fixed effects explained
50.3% of the variance in moral judgment, while the fixed and random effects together
explained 67.2%. There was no main effect of condition but a main effect of vignette
type, such that care/harm and sanctity/degradation vignettes elicited more negative
feelings than social norm vignettes. There was also an interaction between false
heartbeat feedback condition and vignette type, such that fast heartbeat feedback
caused more negative feelings for care/harm vignettes (β = -0.34, 95% CI [-0.56, -0.11],
p = 0.003) than for social norm vignettes.
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Difference between false heartbeat feedback and measured heart rate
One possibility is that reactions to the vignettes varied according to the difference
between the false heartbeat feedback speed and measured heart rate, as opposed to
one or the other independently. Discrepancies between the brain’s expectations of
bodily activity and actual bodily activity can motivate behavior aimed at reconciling
those discrepancies (Barrett, 2017). Therefore, participants who heard heartbeat
feedback that was substantially faster or slower than their own heart rate might have
responded differently to the vignettes than those whose feedback more closely matched
their own heart rate.
To explore this possibility, a difference score was calculated between each
participant’s assigned false heartbeat feedback speed and their measured heart rate.
Correlations were tested between these difference scores and moral wrongness
judgments and self-reported negative feelings. Difference scores were not associated
with wrongness judgments or negative feelings (ps > 0.19).
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Chapter 8: Discussion
The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether the perception of
elevated physiological arousal, an integral part of the subjective experience of emotion,
can affect moral judgment. Based on affect-as-information theory (Storbeck & Clore,
2008), I expected that participants who believed their heart was beating quickly would
experience more intense negative feelings in response to reading about moral
transgressions. If emotion drives moral judgment, these intensified feelings would result
in more severe moral wrongness judgments. If, on the other hand, emotion does not
drive moral judgment, these intensified feelings would have no effect on moral
wrongness judgments.
False heartbeat feedback affected moral judgment, but opposite to the expected
direction: For sanctity/degradation vignettes and, to a lesser extent, care/harm
vignettes, slow heartbeat feedback caused higher moral wrongness judgments. This
effect was not moderated by either interoceptive sensitivity or mindful non-reactivity;
that is, the false heartbeat feedback’s effects were not associated with participants’
self-reported tendency to perceive or react to internal bodily signals. Self-reported
negative feelings were independently associated with higher moral wrongness
judgments, but they did not mediate the effect of false heartbeat feedback condition,
which is inconsistent with affect-as-information theory. As for why slow instead of fast
heartbeat feedback caused more severe moral judgment, there are several possibilities
to consider.
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False heartbeat feedback’s possible effects on moral judgment
Fast heartbeat feedback induced positive affect
Several participants reported during debriefing that the heartbeat feedback
“relaxed”, “calmed”, or “grounded” them, and there is evidence that inducing positive
emotion can influence moral decisions. For instance, listening to happy music,
compared to anger-inducing music, caused participants to be less severe in their
judgments of moral transgressions (Seidel & Prinz, 2013). Also, listening to happy
music (Pastötter et al., 2013) and watching a funny video (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006)
have each been found to make people more utilitarian in sacrificial moral dilemmas,
presumably by counteracting the negative emotions associated with the prospect of
deliberately harming another person. Thus, in the present study, the calming effect of
the heartbeat feedback may have counteracted the negative emotional reactions to the
transgressions that would otherwise have provoked harsher wrongness judgments.
Another related possibility is that the false heartbeat feedback triggered emotion
regulation processes, not emotions themselves. Three studies, two in American
undergraduates (Feinberg et al., 2012, Studies 1 and 2) and another in Chinese
undergraduates (Zhang et al., 2017), found that a greater self-reported ability to
regulate one’s own emotions was associated with lower wrongness judgments of others’
transgressions. Another study (Feinberg et al., 2012, Study 3) found that encouraging
participants to reappraise their own emotions (i.e., to construe an emotion-eliciting
stimulus in a way that decreases its intensity) dampened their emotional reactions to
transgressions and, in turn, caused lower wrongness judgments. Thus, in the present
study, the false heartbeat feedback may have drawn participants’ attention to their own
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emotions and motivated emotion regulation, which in turn caused more lenient
judgment. Indeed, several participants reported during debriefing that the heartbeat
feedback made them “more aware” of their feelings and made them “want to calm”
themselves.
Understanding false heartbeat feedback as an induction of a pleasant, or at least
less unpleasant, affective state sheds new light on the previous finding that fast
heartbeat feedback caused people to behave more ethically (Gu et al., 2013). There is a
good deal of evidence that positive feelings promote prosocial behavior (see Aknin et
al., 2018 for a review). For instance, in a study of American community adults,
participants randomly assigned to find a dime in a phone booth, compared to those who
found nothing, were more likely to help a confederate who dropped a folder full of
papers (Isen & Levin, 1972). In another study, American undergraduates instructed to
reminisce on past experiences that made them happy, compared to neutral or guilty
experiences, were more likely to agree to donate blood (O’Malley & Andrews, 1983).
From this perspective, Gu and colleagues’ participants volunteered for charity more and
cheated for self-gain less because the false heartbeat feedback made them feel better,
not worse.
These explanations assume the fast heartbeat feedback would cause more
positive affect—or less negative affect, via emotion regulation—than the slow heartbeat
feedback. Yet the findings were mixed with respect to a difference in self-reported
negative feelings between the false heartbeat feedback conditions: The mediation
analysis showed no significant differences, while the exploratory linear model showed
that fast heartbeat feedback decreased negative feelings only for care/harm vignettes.
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There are several potential reasons for this inconsistency. For one, positive and
negative feelings may be orthogonal, not parts of a zero-sum continuum (Kercher, 1992;
Kim & Wang, 2021; Terracciano et al., 2003). In this case, a direct measure of positive
feelings would be necessary to rule out the possibility that fast heartbeat feedback
induced positive feelings. Second, it may be that the self-report measure of negative
feelings did not capture negative feelings as intended. In the present study, moral
judgment and negative feeling questions were separated into two blocks, to avoid
drawing participants’ attention to their feelings during their moral judgments. But the
vignettes may have had a weaker emotional impact on second viewing. Repeating the
study with concurrent measurements of moral judgment and negative feelings, and with
alternative behavioral and psychophysiological measures of negative feelings, could
address this issue. A third and final possible reason for the inconsistent findings on
negative feelings is that the current study did not have enough statistical power to
detect a mediation. The present study was powered for a two-by-three between-within
interaction in a linear mixed-effects model, which generally requires a smaller sample
size than that required for mediation analysis (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007).
False heartbeat feedback imposed a cognitive load
Another explanation for the unexpected results is that the false heartbeat
feedback served primarily to distract or impose a cognitive load on participants. Several
participants reported during debriefing that hearing the heartbeat feedback was
distracting, and previous research suggests that fluctuations in cognitive resources can
moderate the influence of emotion on moral judgment. For instance, studies in English
and Singaporean undergraduates have found that anger inductions caused participants
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to punish wrongdoers and compensate victims of wrongdoing less when participants
were distracted by playing Tetris or estimating the number of dots on a screen
(Gummerum et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2011). Another study of Dutch undergraduates
reported similar results with disgust: Its effect on moral judgment was weaker when
participants were distracted by playing Tetris (Van Dillen et al., 2012). If participants in
the present study who heard fast heartbeat feedback were more distracted than those
who heard slow feedback, it might have either diluted the influence of emotion on their
wrongness judgments or disrupted their comprehension of the transgressions in the first
place.
Another view on the effects of cognitive load is that it emphasizes the
consequences of actions, as opposed to the mental states of actors. Developmental
research has consistently found an “outcome to intent” shift from childhood to
adulthood: While young children tend to base their wrongness judgments on whether an
agent is causally responsible for an outcome, by late childhood and adolescence they
give more weight to an agent’s intentions (Baird & Astington, 2004; Cushman et al.,
2013; Piaget, 1932). However, there is evidence that under cognitive load (e.g.,
observing a transgression while having to repeat sentences heard through
headphones), adults revert to a more childlike approach to moral judgment, in that they
base their judgments more on outcomes than representations of others’ mental states
(which demand more cognitive resources) (Buon et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2021).
Participants in the fast feedback group may have experienced a similar reversion that
made them more lenient toward harmless wrongs (e.g., sanctity/degradation vignettes)
and wrongs that demand representations of mental states (e.g., care/harm vignettes
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involving emotional but not physical harm). To explore this possibility, future studies
should carefully account for the extent to which different moral transgressions engage
cognitive resources.
Gu and colleagues’ (2013) findings are worth considering under the assumption
that their false heartbeat feedback was actually a cognitive load manipulation. There is
a good deal of evidence that cognitive load makes it more difficult for people to lie and
deceive, because deception generally requires more cognitive effort than honesty (Vrij
et al., 2006). For instance, one study of US community adults found that in the same
deception task that Gu and colleagues used, participants lied for financial gain less
when under time pressure (Capraro et al., 2019). Another study found that Dutch
community adults were less likely to lie about random dice rolls to receive a higher
payout when they had to memorize long strings of digits (Van ’t Veer et al., 2014). This
suggests that participants in Gu and colleagues’ study who heard fast heartbeat
feedback cheated less during the deception task (Studies 2, 3, and 4) because they had
fewer cognitive resources with which to cheat. Importantly, the moderating effect of
cognitive load on deception applies to self-deception as well as deception of others.
One study in American undergraduates found that while people judged misbehavior
more leniently when they themselves, versus others, were the culprit, the difference
disappeared under digit-string cognitive load (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008). In another
study of American undergraduates, participants under digit-string cognitive load were
less likely to rationalize taking a vacation to a resort with unethical labor practices
(Paharia et al., 2013). Given these results, Gu and colleagues’ participants who heard
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fast heartbeat feedback might have agreed to volunteer for a charitable cause (Study 1)
because they could not as easily generate self-serving justifications for declining.
It is important to note that both of these interpretations related to cognitive load
assume that the fast heartbeat feedback is more distracting than the slow heartbeat
feedback. There is no direct evidence for this claim. Repeating the study with a
measure of attentional control or cognitive ability, such as the Stroop task (Stroop,
1935) or the N-back task (Jaeggi et al., 2010), as well as a comprehension check for the
vignettes, could confirm whether the effects of the false feedback on judgment were due
to the imposition of cognitive load.
Fast heartbeat feedback successfully intensified negative affect
Finally, it is important to consider the possibility that the fast heartbeat feedback
did indeed have the expected effect of intensifying negative emotional reactions to the
transgressions. In this case, one interpretation of the unexpected pattern of moral
judgment is that participants’ negative emotional reactions caused them to disengage
from the transgressions in an effort to minimize their own distress.
Based on stress and coping theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), individuals cope
with distress by either regulating it or trying to remove its source. In a distressing,
morally charged scenario, such coping often takes the form of moral disengagement, or
the decoupling of one’s internal moral standards from one's actions (Moore, 2015). For
example, a study of Italian high school students found that a higher tendency to
experience distress when witnessing others’ negative experiences was associated with
a lower willingness to help someone in need in a hypothetical dilemma (Paciello et al.,
2013). Importantly, the effect of distress was mediated by self-reported moral
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disengagement, suggesting that participants coped with distress by temporarily
removing what they thought to be its source: their sense of responsibility to others.
Another study, in Italian community adults, found a similar pattern: Higher negative
emotional reactivity predicted higher levels of self-reported moral disengagement, which
in turn predicted more hostile or unethical behavior in the workplace (Fida et al., 2015).
Moral disengagement is also associated with moral judgment: A study of U.K.
community adults found that those with higher self-reported moral disengagement
judged sexual harassment as less morally wrong (Page & Pina, 2018). Applied to the
present study, participants in the fast heartbeat feedback group may have coped with
their distress by morally disengaging from the transgressions, which in turn caused
lower wrongness judgments.
However, stress and coping theory also holds that people sometimes try to
remove the source of their distress by more tightly adhering to moral norms, rather than
disengaging. For instance, a study of Swiss undergraduates found that experimentally
induced distress led to more prosocial behaviors like trusting and sharing with others
(von Dawans et al., 2012). Another study, in a sample of American adults, found that
those who reported a higher tendency to experience distress in social situations were
more likely to give to charity (Kim & Kou, 2014). These results align with Gu and
colleagues’ (2013) explanation of their findings: Participants in their study who heard the
fast heartbeat feedback coped with the resultant distress by cheating less for financial
gain and volunteering more for a charitable cause. It is therefore possible that in the
present study, the fast heartbeat group’s leniency toward others’ transgressions was a
form of coping with distress through prosociality (but see Zhen et al., 2021).
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There are reasons for treating these explanations with skepticism. First, the effect
of the false heartbeat feedback was not mediated by self-reported negative feelings.
While the feedback appears to have affected negative feelings (for care/harm vignettes
only), it was opposite to the expected direction—fast feedback caused lower negative
feelings than slow feedback. Second, the false heartbeat feedback conditions did not
differ on measured heart rate, which is a common index of affective arousal. Finally,
while the interpretations above are related to distress, there is no way to tell from the
current data which specific negative emotion participants might have felt. Repeating the
false heartbeat feedback method and adding a specific measure of distress, as well as
measures of moral disengagement and prosocial behavior, could resolve this
uncertainty.
Interoceptive sensitivity and mindful non-reactivity
Against expectations, the effect of the false heartbeat feedback on moral
judgment was not moderated by interoceptive sensitivity or mindful non-reactivity.
However, interoceptive sensitivity and mindful non-reactivity negatively were
independently associated with higher and lower wrongness judgments, respectively.
Interoceptive sensitivity was also associated with higher self-reported negative feelings,
while mindful non-reactivity was marginally associated with lower self-reported negative
feelings. This could be taken as indirect evidence that the false heartbeat feedback did
not intensify negative emotion: If it did, one would expect its effect on moral judgment to
be moderated by individual difference measures that are associated with both negative
feelings and moral judgment. Then again, the more straightforward explanation for a
lack of moderation may be low statistical power. The sample was sized to power a
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two-way interaction between false heartbeat feedback condition and vignette type,
disregarding moderators, and nine participants were missing questionnaire data.
Curiously, the correlations between the individual difference measures and
wrongness judgments were specific to sanctity/degradation and social norm vignettes,
not care/harm vignettes. Many of the sanctity/degradation vignettes involve behaviors
known to provoke disgust, like incest and necrophilia, and disgust is thought to be a
more embodied experience than other emotions (Chapman & Anderson, 2012; Schnall,
2016). Thus, it makes sense that higher sensitivity and reactivity to internal bodily
sensations would be associated with stronger condemnation of disgusting acts. But it is
less clear why the individual differences would be associated with stronger
condemnation of social norm but not care/harm violations. Some of the social norm
violations involve unusual eating choices, like putting ketchup on a Caesar salad or
marshmallows on vanilla ice cream, which may have provoked disgust in some
participants. But most are not clearly disgusting. Future research should investigate the
possibility that care/harm violations provoke a less embodied emotional response than
other moral and nonmoral norm violations. In any case, internal consistency for the
measure of interoceptive sensitivity was very low, so this interoceptive sensitivity data
should be interpreted with caution.
The role of measured heart rate and heart rate variability
There was no difference in measured heart rate between the false heartbeat
feedback conditions, which rules out the possibility that false heartbeat feedback
affected judgment indirectly via actual changes in heart rate. If the false heartbeat
feedback induced positive or negative affect, this finding would be consistent with the
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claim that emotion is based on the subjective perception of bodily activity (James, 1884;
Valins, 1966). More studies that manipulate perceptions of bodily activity, while using
other measures of emotion and controlling for cognitive load, are required to
substantiate this view of emotion.
Higher measured heart rate was marginally associated with lower wrongness
judgments for moral vignettes, regardless of false heartbeat feedback condition. This is
inconsistent with the previously reported pattern that increased arousal, whether
subjective or objective, causes more intense evaluative judgments (Storbeck & Clore,
2008). It could be that the direction of causation was reversed, and giving more severe
or lenient moral judgments caused one’s heart rate to decrease or increase,
respectively. Future research should manipulate actual heart rate (see Sinclair et al.,
1994) to clarify the direction of causation, if any, between actual heart rate and moral
judgment. Also, the present analyses of measured heart rate involved the average heart
rate across all moral judgment vignettes, rather than multiple vignette-by-vignette data
points. Using vignette-by-vignette heart rate data would clarify whether
moment-to-moment fluctuations in heart rate are associated with more lenient or severe
moral judgment.
Heart rate variability was not independently associated with moral judgment, but
it had a marginal interaction with condition, such that fast heartbeat feedback caused
higher moral wrongness judgments for those with high resting HRV. Based on the
neurovisceral integration model, this suggests that participants who were more likely to
integrate internal bodily signals into decision-making (as indexed by high resting HRV)
were more influenced by the perception of elevated physiological arousal. This may be
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indirect evidence that the fast heartbeat feedback did indeed intensify emotion.
However, resting HRV was not significantly correlated with the self-report measures of
sensitivity and reactivity to internal bodily signals. Moreover, its interaction with condition
was only marginally significant, and weakened substantially with the removal of an
outlier. Future studies are required to better understand HRV’s potential role as an index
of neurovisceral integration during moral judgment.
Sentimentalism versus rationalism
The overall goal of this work was to test the sentimentalist hypothesis that
emotion drives moral judgment. The study tested two specific components of the
sentimentalist hypothesis: the amplification hypothesis, which is the claim that emotion
can cause a person to view a moral transgression as more morally wrong, and the
moralization hypothesis, the claim that emotion can cause a person to view a nonmoral
act as moral (Pizarro et al., 2011).
The false heartbeat feedback did not affect judgments of social norm violations,
which does not support the moralization hypothesis. The results are more ambiguous
with respect to the amplification hypothesis. If the fast heartbeat feedback decreased
moral wrongness judgments by inducing positive emotion, or by motivating regulation of
negative emotion, it would imply that negative emotions can increase perceptions of
wrongness. This would be consistent with the amplification hypothesis. If the fast
heartbeat feedback decreased moral wrongness judgments by intensifying negative
emotion, it would suggest that negative emotions may sometimes deamplify moral
judgment—that is, they might provoke coping mechanisms, like moral disengagement,
that decrease perceptions of wrongness. Finally, if the fast heartbeat feedback
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decreased moral wrongness judgments by imposing a cognitive load, it could point to
either amplification or moral rationalism. On the one hand, the feedback might have
disrupted the cognitive processes required to register the moral wrongness of a given
act, which would support rationalism. On the other hand, it might have moderated the
influence of participants’ emotional reactions on their moral judgments (see Gummerum
et al., 2016; Van Dillen et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2011), which would support the
amplification hypothesis.
The finding that the false heartbeat feedback affected judgments of
sanctity/degradation vignettes more than care/harm vignettes supports the claim that
different domains of morality draw upon different mental functions—such as attention or
emotion, depending on one’s interpretation of the false heartbeat feedback’s effect.
Future research should examine how the mechanism of moral judgment might change
based on the specific domain of the moral transgression.
Limitations
This research has several noteworthy limitations. First is the sample. The 77
participants provided 75% power to detect the anticipated effect size, but this is lower
than the target 80%. The results should therefore be treated as tentative. Also, the
sample was ethnically diverse, but consisted mostly of young undergraduate students
from Brooklyn, New York. Further research is needed in samples that vary on other
demographic dimensions, particularly when testing general claims about such a
complex and culturally variable phenomenon as moral decision-making.
A related limitation is that none of the linear mixed models contained
demographic covariates. This was to maximize statistical power, as a few participants
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were missing data for gender, age, and ethnicity. However, examining the roles of these
and other factors could shed some light on the developmental and cultural variability of
moral judgment.
There are three additional methodological limitations. First, the speed of the false
heartbeat feedback varied between but not within participants: The pre-recorded heart
rate was either 96 or 60 beats per minute, with no variation throughout the task. While
low heart rate variability is a common sign of emotional strain (Jönsson, 2007; Nickel &
Nachreiner, 2003), the steadiness of the feedback may have induced a state of diffuse
high arousal that was less readily attributed to the vignettes. Indeed, many participants
said during debriefing that they were expecting the heartbeat feedback to change more
from vignette to vignette. Thus, manipulating perceived heart rate within participants
would have not only increased statistical power but also potentially provoked stronger
and more dynamic emotional responses to the vignettes. (Interestingly, several
participants did report hearing vignette-to-vignette variability in the heartbeat feedback,
even though there was none, which raises the question of how our expectations of our
internal bodily signals shape our perceptions.) Second, the experiment was
programmed such that there was no trial-by-trial heart rate data. Trial-by-trial variations
in heart rate, as opposed to the average heart rate across all trials, could have revealed
whether the false heartbeat feedback intensified negative feelings for certain vignettes
more than others. Third, including a neutral control condition, with no heartbeat
feedback at all, could have resolved some of the ambiguity of the false heartbeat
feedback’s effects. For instance, if the false heartbeat feedback was a distraction, one

57

would expect both fast and slow feedback, rather than just one or the other, to change
moral judgment relative to control.
The final two limitations are theoretical. First, one reason the
sentimentalism-vs-rationalism debate is hard to settle empirically is that there is
inconsistency in the specific claims thought to be at stake. Some see sentimentalism as
the position that emotion drives morality “at least in part” (Kauppinen, 2022, p. 1), while
others see it as the more substantial claim that moral judgment is “ultimately grounded
in mere feelings or affect that do not constitute beliefs or merely facilitate reasoning”
(May, 2018, p. 288). The present experiment was designed to test the relatively modest
claim that emotion can increase the severity of moral judgment, as well as the stronger
claim that emotion can cause one to moralize nonmoral actions. Both of these claims
align with the belief that emotion drives moral judgment “at least in part”. However, even
if the results unambiguously supported the amplification and moralization hypotheses,
they would not be able to rule out the possibility that the induced emotions “merely
facilitated reasoning” or had some other indirect effect on judgment.
A second, related challenge of the sentimentalism-vs-rationalism debate is that it
can be difficult to draw a clear border between emotion and reasoning. Many moral
psychologists have defined reasoning as the formation of new beliefs via conscious and
deliberate inference (Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2001). But inference and belief-formation can
also be unconscious, automatic, and without affect, such as when the brain transforms
ambiguous external sensory input into coherent objects and scenes (Seth, 2019). Many
findings in moral psychology support sentimentalism when interpreted with the former,
more constrained definition of reasoning, but become more ambiguous with a more
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expansive definition. For example, moral dumbfounding is the phenomenon whereby a
person judges a disgusting but apparently harmless act as morally wrong but cannot
articulate the reasoning behind their judgment (Haidt et al., 2000). This was initially
deemed evidence that moral judgment is based on mere inarticulable gut feelings. But it
could be that people unconsciously perceive and reason about harm even in ostensibly
victimless situations (Schein & Gray, 2018). Definitions of emotion also vary widely.
Some argue that emotions are mere bodily states with little or no cognitive content
(James, 1884; Prinz, 2006), while others maintain that emotions do have cognitive
content and are a form of belief in and of themselves (Nussbaum, 2001). The current
work uses a relatively neutral definition of emotions as feelings dependent on bodily
states and involving dimensions of valence and arousal. In any case, this lack of
consensus about the divide between emotion and reasoning underscores the difficulties
of creating reliable operational definitions of everyday psychological concepts (Ramsey,
2022).
Conclusions
This study shows that a person’s perception of their heart rate can affect how
they judge other people’s behavior. More research is required to determine whether this
effect is due to a change in emotion, an imposition of cognitive load, or some other
factor. However, regardless of the mechanism, these findings provide further
experimental evidence that extraneous information can influence moral
decision-making. They also provide evidence that actual, not just perceived, internal
bodily signals are associated with moral judgment. Future research should further
explore the viability of false heartbeat feedback as a manipulation of emotion as well as
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the role of physiological activity in moral decision-making. Future research should also
investigate how extraneous information can shape moral decision-making in different
real-world contexts. Those charged with codifying the human sense of right and wrong,
such as lawyers and policymakers, should pay close attention to the ways it might be
led astray.
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Appendix A
List of transgression vignettes
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Appendix B
Questionnaires
Private Body Consciousness scale (Miller et al., 1981):
- I am sensitive to internal bodily tensions.
- I know immediately when my mouth or throat gets dry.
- I can often feel my heart beating.
- I am quick to sense the hunger contractions of my stomach.
- I am very aware of changes in my body temperature.
Response options: 1 (“extremely uncharacteristic”), 2 (“uncharacteristic”), 3
(“neither”), 4 (“characteristic”), 5 (“extremely characteristic”)
Mindful Non-Reactivity to Inner Experience scale (Baer et al., 2006):
- I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them.
- I watch my feelings without getting lost in them.
- In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting.Usually when I
have distressing thoughts or images, I am able just to notice them without
reacting.
- Usually when I have distressing thoughts or images, I feel calm soon after.
- Usually when I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and am aware
of the thought or image without getting taken over by it.
- Usually when I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let
them go.
Response options: 1 (“very rarely true”), 2 (“rarely true”), 3 (“sometimes true”), 4
(“often true”), 5 (“very often true”)
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Appendix C
Demographic Information Form

What is your age? __________

What is your gender? (circle one)
Female

Male

Other (please specify): ___________________

What is your race? (circle one)
Black/African-American

White

Asian/Pacific Islander

Other (please specify): ________________

Are you Hispanic or Latin?
Yes / No

What year of college are you in? ____________

What is your major? ______________________
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Native American

Appendix D
Debriefing Statement
In this experiment, we told you that the equipment testing was unrelated to the study
about social decision-making. However, this was not true: the real purpose of the study
was to examine how one’s perception of one’s heart rate (as part of the “equipment
testing”) affects one’s moral judgments (as part of the social decision-making section).
We asked you to test heart rate recording equipment and told you that the sound you
heard through the headphones was playback of your own heartbeat. In reality, the
heartbeat sound was pre-recorded. Depending on which condition you were randomly
given, the pre-recorded heartbeat sound was either fast or slow. Our goal was to see
whether participants who heard fast heartbeat feedback would judge morally-charged
scenarios differently than participants who heard slow heartbeat feedback. In other
words, the independent variable, or manipulation, was the speed of the false heartbeat
feedback, and the dependent variable, or outcome, was your moral judgments. We
didn’t tell you the true purpose of our experiment because your behavior might have
been different if you knew the physiological recording equipment was related to the
moral judgments.
Past research has shown that when individuals believe that they are physiologically
aroused, this can influence the moral decisions they make. For example, convincing
people that their heart is beating quickly can cause them to cheat less in competitive
games (Gu et al., 2013). Our experiment continued this work by looking at whether
subjective heart rate affects people’s judgments of morally-charged scenarios.
Because you did not know the true purpose of the experiment when you signed the
consent form, you may withdraw your data from the study now if you wish. If you choose
to do this, we will delete all of your data. This will not affect your compensation. Please
let the experimenter know if you would like to withdraw your data.
Reference: Gu, J., Zhong, C. B., & Page-Gould, E. (2013). Listen to your heart: when
false somatic feedback shapes moral behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology.
General, 142, 2, 307-12.
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Appendix E
Plots for linear mixed-effects model assumption checks
Figure E1
Standardized model residuals plotted against fitted response values for main model.

Figure E2
Quantile-quantile plot of sample residuals against theoretical (normal) quantiles for main model.
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Figure E3
Standardized model residuals plotted against fitted response values for PBC/MNR moderation
model.

Figure E4
Quantile-quantile plot of sample residuals against theoretical (normal) quantiles for PBC/MNR
moderation model.
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Figure E5
Standardized model residuals plotted against fitted response values for HRV moderation model.

Figure E6
Quantile-quantile plot of sample residuals against theoretical (normal) quantiles for HRV
moderation model.
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Figure E7
Standardized model residuals plotted against fitted response values for exploratory model
predicting self-reported negative feelings.

Figure E8
Quantile-quantile plot of sample residuals against theoretical (normal) quantiles for exploratory
model predicting self-reported negative feelings.
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